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64. The Unity of Architectonic Reasoning
in Kant and I Ching
Stephen R. Palmquist
Human reason is by nature
architectonic, i. e. , it considers all
cognitions as belonging to a possible
system, and hence it permits only such
principles as at least do not render an
intended cognition incapable of
standing together with others in some
system or other.1
The unity of human personhood in Kant’s philosophical system is not
incompatible with a belief in the duality of human nature, nor with
an appreciation of the fragmented nature of our empirical existence.
He portrays human beings as belonging simultaneously to both the phe-
nomenal and the noumenal “worlds”, as being causally determined by
events in the natural world that we cannot control, yet having the spon-
taneous power to initiate freely chosen actions that constitute a moral
world. Likewise, he makes numerous finer distinctions between various
types or aspects of human character or personality throughout the three
Critiques, as well as in his minor writings, lectures, and notes. As the
foregoing essays demonstrate, we find in each Critique and throughout
Kant’s writings a sometimes mesmerizing array of distinctions regarding
our nature as human beings, yet each Critique is united by its focus on
one of three central questions (A805/B833): “1. What can I know?
2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope?” Moreover, these questions
are united by one question that combines them all: “What is man?”
1 A474/B502. For a thoroughgoing discussion of Kant’s use of the term “archi-
tectonic” and of the nature and structure of the architectonic plan he used to
structure the Critical System, see my books, Kant’s System of Perspectives: An ar-
chitectonic interpretation of the Critical philosophy (Lanham: University Press of
America, 1993), ch. III, and Kant’s Critical Religion: Volume Two of Kant’s Sys-
tem of Perspectives (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), apx.III.2–3.
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(9:25)—a deceptively simple question that seems to call for one, all-en-
compassing answer.
Kant’s clue as to how we can, paradoxically, both believe in the fun-
damental unity of human personhood and acknowledge the seemingly
endless “aggregate” of unorganized facts that characterizes our human
nature is that Critical philosophers must employ a special kind of think-
ing he calls “architectonic”. My purpose in this essay is not to describe
how architectonic thinking manifests itself in all Kant’s intricate theories
of human personhood—that task has already been fulfilled by the many
insightful essays contained in this collection. Rather, after discussing
Kant’s special, architectonic approach to philosophical reasoning and
its systematic relation to the twelve categories, I shall suggest that the
same approach can be found, in its essential nature though not in its de-
tailed out-working, in the oldest and arguably the most influential of all
Chinese classics, the I Ching. If I am correct, then the “Chinaman of
Konigsberg”2 was even more authentically Chinese than either he or
Nietzsche realized.
The I Ching or Book of Changes, as it is sometimes called, is essential-
ly a set of commentaries on sixty-four unique hexagrams that are each
constructed out of six broken or solid lines. Because each line can appear
in only two forms (broken or solid) and each component of the system
contains exactly six such lines, the sixty-four hexagrams represent all pos-
sible permutations of any system exhibiting this logical form. This is true
for the simple, mathematical reason that 2x2x2x2x2x2 (i. e., 26) is 64.
The Chinese classic interprets each hexagram as a symbol representing
a certain human situation or type of situation, based on its unique ar-
rangement of broken and solid lines. Those who use the I Ching as a
guideline for decision-making (or, more crassly, as a tool for divining
the future) adopt this set of 64 logical relations as an a priori framework
by randomly choosing two of the 64 hexagrams and viewing them as a
symbolic representation of the change being exhibited by some situation
they wish to understand more fully. Mastering the I Ching requires one
to learn the nuances of 4,096 (i. e., 64x64) mathematically possible types
of situational change generated by the logic of this system. Although I
am still a novice in this regard, I shall illustrate at the end of this essay
how such applications might operate as a practical, architectonic guide-
line.
2 I assess the legitimacy of viewing Kant as taking a “Chinese” approach in “How
‘Chinese’ Was Kant?” (abridged), The Philosopher 84:1 (Spring 1996), 3–9.
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An intriguing feature of this ancient framework for interpreting
human experience is that it all arises from a fundamental unity, called
the Dao (though the Dao paradoxically also underlies the very distinc-
tion between unity and diversity). As expressed in the well-known lines
from section 42 of Lao Tzu’s Dao De Jing :3
DAO generates the One
The One generates the Two
The Two generates the Three
The Three generates all things.
Reading these lines in connection with their roots in the I Ching pro-
vides an excellent expression of the book’s underlying assumption,
that unity and diversity are not necessarily incompatible concepts, but
can work together to elucidate how we experience human life as a co-
herent whole.
This well-known passage has some interesting implications for the
question of how the unity of human personhood can coexist with the
diversity of life as we experience it; but what has any of this to do
with Kant? It has to do with Kant because he famously (or by some ac-
counts, infamously) insists that philosophers ought not interpret the
world in the manner of Aristotle, by merely collecting data from our
observations of the world and inductively classifying these according
to some likely set of conclusions, but should rather impose order onto
our subject-matter through a predetermined principle of division that
we give to the system of concepts we employ.4 The Dao on its own is
a name for undifferentiated wholeness, not unlike Kant’s “thing in it-
self”. We come to know it as “one”, “two”, “three”, and eventually
“all things”, only by imposing our mental categorizations (the 64-hexa-
3 Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching: The Book of Meaning and Life, tr. Richard Wilhelm and
H. G. Ostwald (London: Arkana, 1985), 46.
4 For a good account of the tendency among early twentieth century Kant schol-
ars to blame all the infelicities one sees in Kant’s writings on his architectonic
superstructure, see Paula Manchester, “What Kant Means by Architectonic”
Kant und die Berliner Aufkla˘rung: Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses,
Bd. II (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 622–30. Manchester’s own interpre-
tation of Kant’s view of architectonic is, however, unfortunately clouded by her
overly Aristotelian reading of Kant’s usage, combined with an overemphasis on
the significance of Kant’s reference to the “teaching” of reason in connection
with architectonic. As I shall demonstrate, Kant explicitly contrasts his position
with Aristotle’s “aggregate” approach, so it seems highly unlikely that he saw
himself as merely refining the same meaning Aristotle gave to this term.
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grams, in classical Chinese traditions) onto it. This—dare I say?—Kant-
ian aspect of philosophical Daoism might go unnoticed if we interpret it
apart from its relation to the I Ching. Likewise, Kant’s unified answer to
the “What is man?” question is likely to remain obscure if we do not
recognize how his table of twelve categories originates as a presupposi-
tion of architectonic reasoning. Let us therefore look first at chapter III
of CPR’s Transcendental Doctrine of Method, where Kant explains
what he means by “architectonic”, then examine how he provides
early hints concerning this important philosophical method in the unti-
tled introductory section of chapter I of the Transcendental Analytic,
where he explicitly refers to the “clue” that leads to the discovery of
the categories.
In chapter III of Kant’s System of Perspectives5 I have presented in
great detail the multi-layered structure of Kant’s so-called “architectonic
plan” for constructing his philosophical system, arguing throughout the
rest of the book that commentators who misunderstand and prematurely
reject Kant’s theories typically do so because they fail to appreciate how
his various arguments contribute to this plan as a whole. After being
criticized by Paula Manchester for misunderstanding Kant’s use of the
term “architectonic”,6 I wrote a detailed reply, in appendix III.2 of
Kant’s Critical Religion,7 presenting a more explicit account of what
Kant means by this key term. Without repeating all the details of
those two studies, I shall here summarize the key features of Kant’s po-
sition.
Kant begins the Architectonic chapter with this intriguing defini-
tion: “By an architectonic I understand the art of systems. Since sys-
tematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition into science,
i. e., makes a system out of a mere aggregate of it, architectonic is the
5 For the full text of Kant’s System, see http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1.
6 Manchester views Kant’s “architectonic” as essentially following Aristotle’s use
of the special Greek term, architektn (Manchester, 524n). After reviewing the
history of different uses of this term, she assumes Kant must have been writing
within this Greek tradition; unfortunately, she never presents such a thorough
analysis of the distinctive way Kant himself uses the term, especially in light of his
explicit contrast between his view of how to construct a table of categories and
that of Aristotle (see note 4, above). Manchester and I debated this issue at a
special session of the 1998 World Congress of Philosophy, but without reach-
ing agreement.
7 For the full text of Kant’s Critical Religion, see http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/
ksp2.
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doctrine of that which is scientific in our cognition in general” (A832/
B860). Here we see Kant connecting architectonic with system-making,
apparently hinting at a metaphor between the roles of the architect and
the philosopher. Just as an architect’s job is to design or “make the plan”
for a building, the architectonic philosopher’s task is to make systems by
imposing order onto the “mere aggregate” (i. e., the unorganized data)
that otherwise characterizes our experience of the empirical world. Per-
haps the most intriguing aspect suggested by this passage is that Kant
calls architectonic an “art”, even though it is at the same time, some-
what paradoxically, the formal factor that makes a body of knowledge
scientific. He then adds that reason prescribes laws that unify “the manifold
cognitions under one idea” (A832/B860). This idea, he tells us, is “the
rational concept of the form of a whole” that determines both “the do-
main of the manifold” and “the positions of the parts with respect to
each other”. That is, the task of architectonic reasoning is to determine
the relation between the otherwise unrelated parts of a transcendental sys-
tem’s form.
Two sentences later Kant again emphasizes this relational aspect.
Apparently, he had an architectonic reason for placing this chapter
third in the Doctrine of Method: it fulfills a function that corresponds
to the category of relation in his Table of Categories. As I argue in chap-
ter VII of Kant’s System of Perspectives, the component of the Doctrine of
Elements that functions as the architectonic structuring plan is the cat-
egories, applied in the schematized form of the principles of pure under-
standing. Here in the Doctrine of Method, Kant therefore appears to be
alluding to a necessary connection between the formal structure of the
categories and that of all architectonic reasoning. If this interpretation is
accurate, then why did Kant not simply come out and state that archi-
tectonic reasoning uses the table of categories (or its predecessor, the
table of the logical forms of judgment in thought) to impose systematic
patterns onto our thought processes? The reason, I believe, is bound up
with Kant’s strategy in dividing the Critiques into Doctrines of Elements
and Method. In each Critique with this division, the two sections are
meant to be independent of each other, in the sense that they work to-
ward the same goal, but from opposite perspectives: content first,
then form. None of the chapters in the Doctrine of Method appeal di-
rectly to the results of the Doctrine of Elements, or vice versa; rather,
they each reveal in different ways reason’s need for just the sort of thing
the foregoing Doctrine of Elements has provided. To connect architec-
tonic in chapter III of the Doctrine of Method too explicitly with the
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4 x 3 = 12 pattern determined by the categories in the Doctrine of El-
ements would have been to beg the question he was attempting to an-
swer. To name the categories or even their numerical structure would
have been to focus on the content of the preferred architectonic plan;
but Kant’s focus in the Doctrine of Method is on the proper form of
philosophical reasoning, a form that could be different for different phi-
losophers.
The second paragraph of the Architectonic also states that the pur-
pose of imposing onto the aggregate of our knowledge an idea that re-
lates the parts to each other within a whole is to “support and advance
[reason’s] essential ends” (A832/B860). Kant unfortunately does not ex-
plain what he means by this phrase. However, the remainder of the
paragraph suggests he is thinking here of reason’s ultimate goal, the uni-
fication of all knowledge; for he claims this prescriptive function of rea-
son (i. e. , reason’s architectonic unity) “allows the absence of any part to
be noticed in our knowledge of the rest,” so that “there can be no con-
tingent addition … that does not have its boundaries determined a pri-
ori” (A832–3/B860–1), thus guaranteeing the completeness of the sys-
tem being constructed. In the Doctrine of Elements, the only tool Kant
develops for achieving such lofty aims is his choice to pattern his system-
atic divisions on the formal structure established by the tables of catego-
ries and logical functions. Perhaps hinting at his own earlier usage, he
concludes this paragraph of the Doctrine of Method by comparing a ra-
tional system’s potential to “grow internally … but not externally” (i. e. ,
to be “articulated” rather than “heaped together”) to that of “an animal
body” (A833/B861). This metaphor is easily understood as referring to
Kant’s conviction that, when constructing a table of categories in refer-
ence to any set of conceptual relations, we must resist the temptation to
add a single new member (e. g., 4 + 1 = 5), for this destroys the logical
unity of the conceptual relations under consideration. Instead, we must
account for any new members by making further internal divisions, just
as Kant does when he divides each category into three “moments”
(4 x 3 = 12).
The third paragraph contains the next two references to “architec-
tonic”. It begins by distinguishing between two ways of relating a schema
and an idea. Viewed empirically, the schema presents the manifold of
knowledge to us independently of any unifying idea, whereas from rea-
son’s a priori perspective, the schema “arises only in consequence of an
idea … and does not await them empirically” (A833/B861). The latter
alone, Kant states, “grounds architectonic unity.” One of the main
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differences between these two forms of relation is that when viewing
the schema “empirically”, we cannot know the “number [of its aims]
… in advance”; but science requires certainty in its distinctions and so
must impose them a priori—that is, “architectonically, for the sake of
its affinity and its derivation from a single supreme and inner end”
(A833–4/B861–2). This passage provides clear evidence that the a pri-
ori unity imposed on the aggregate by reason’s architectonic art has to do
with the 4 x 3 = 12 pattern of the categories. For Kant’s point is pre-
cisely that reason’s architectonic form (as revealed in the categories) en-
ables us to do what would be impossible if we were to use a merely em-
pirical method: to determine the appropriate number that composes any
given set of concepts. Reason’s ability to discern the pattern in advance
is the source of the affinity of the manifold’s parts in an architectonic
system.
The fourth paragraph warns the reader that, although the founder of
every new science bases it on an idea, the initial attempt to schematize
that idea “seldom corresponds to the idea; for this idea lies in reason
like a seed” (A834/B862). As a result, Kant encourages us to be willing
to go beyond the descriptions given by the founders and first propo-
nents of any new science, for they “often fumble around with an idea
that they have not even made distinct to themselves”; our focus should
instead be on the idea and its grounding in reason. This accords well
with my articulation of the logical structure of the architectonic form
of Kant’s System, given in chapter III of Kant’s System of Perspectives.
If Kant is to avoid being hypocritical, he would have to confess that
he, too, like the founder of any new science, had only a vague grasp
of the “idea of the whole” that brought unity and completeness to
his System of transcendental philosophy. (My goal in Kant’s System of
Perspectives was to apply this advice of Kant’s to the task of interpreting
the architectonic structure of his own System.)
The next three occurrences of “architectonic(ally)”, coming in the
fifth paragraph of chapter III, do not tell us anything fundamentally
new about Kant’s understanding of the term. The paragraph begins
by lamenting that systems are typically constructed initially as aggregates,
and that “only after we have long collected relevant cognitions haphaz-
ardly like building materials” does it first become “possible for us to
glimpse the idea in a clearer light and to outline a whole architectoni-
cally, in accordance with the ends of reason” (A834–5/B862–3).
(The fact that Kant made essentially the same point in the so-called Met-
aphysical Deduction [A79–81/B105–7], in criticizing Aristotle’s meth-
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od of collecting categories, provides yet further evidence that the table
of categories is Kant’s most complete expression of the formal structure
he prefers when employing architectonic reasoning.) After likening the
development of aggregate systems to the work of “maggots” (A835/
B863), he claims that “so much material has already been collected”
in relation to human cognition that giving “an architectonic to all
human knowledge … would not only be possible but would not
even be very difficult.” He then says the remainder of the chapter
will merely outline “the architectonic of all cognition from pure rea-
son”.
Without looking any further into the details of the Doctrine of
Method’s Architectonic chapter,8 let us now turn to the Doctrine of El-
ements, to chapter I of the Transcendental Analytic, where Kant first
introduces his perplexing “clue to the discovery of all pure concepts
of the understanding” (A66/B91). In the short (untitled) introductory
section, Kant explicitly compares the “mechanical” method of attempt-
ing to find completeness among the manifold concepts that arise out of
our observations of the world with the special method adopted by the
transcendental philosopher. The former method is the one Aristotle
used to gather and present his list of categories; such “concepts that
are discovered only as the opportunity arises will not reveal any order
and systematic unity, but will rather be ordered in pairs only according
8 From this point much of chapter III consists of a series of twofold divisions of
reason and/or philosophy, intended to provide the reader with a bird’s eye view
of the architectonic form of transcendental philosophy. We can skip over the
details of Kant’s exposition, not only because the various divisions appear at
times to be somewhat incompatible with each other, but also because they
are advanced as examples of architectonic divisions, not as further explications
of the meaning of the term as such. Instead of recounting the details of each
division, we can pass on to Kant’s final use of “architectonic” in CPR. Six para-
graphs before the end of chapter III, immediately after summarizing “the entire
system of metaphysics” in terms of “four main parts” (A846/B874), Kant reaf-
firms several aspects of the meaning of “architectonic” I am defending here
(A847/B875): “The original idea of a philosophy of pure reason itself prescribes
this division; it is therefore architectonic, in conformity with its essential ends
…; and for that very reason [this division] is unchangeable and legislative.”
Once again we see that this term entails that reason has prescribed a division
(i. e. , 4 = 2  2) “in conformity with its essential ends”; because it conforms
to reason’s ends (i. e., to the categories as applied in the principles), this division
can be regarded as authoritative and “unchangeable”. Kant also uses the term
“architectonic in a number of his other writings; for a further discussion of
these references, see Appendix III.3 of Kant’s Critical Religion.
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to similarities …, from the simple to the more composite” (A66–7/
B91–2). By contrast, the latter “has the advantage but also the obliga-
tion to seek its concepts in accordance with a principle”; Kant thus
adopts this approach to produce a table of categories consisting of con-
cepts that “spring pure and unmixed, out of the understanding, as abso-
lute unity” (A67/B92, emphasis added). The resulting table illustrates the
correct procedure for architectonic philosophizing, while that proce-
dure constitutes the “clue” to understanding why Kant thinks the twel-
vefold table of categories is complete in the form he presents it. Adopting
such a predetermined, architectonic plan is the only way to avoid a sit-
uation where the choice of basic concepts depends merely “upon whim
or chance.”9
I shall now conclude with some further reflections on the I Ching,
based on an experimental application of the latter to the thesis advanced
in this essay, that the unity of the I Ching is also based on a predeter-
mined, a priori form. At the risk of appearing foolish to any interpreters
who are not yet convinced that one must take into account Kant’s belief
in the architectonic nature of correct philosophical reasoning, if we are
to interpret his philosophical doctrines accurately, I shall treat the I
Ching as itself offering us an architectonic plan (though its form is clearly
different, based on 26 rather than on 3x4) and will “ask” it a specific
question about the unity of architectonic reasoning. By randomly select-
ing two hexagrams in the manner mentioned at the beginning of this
essay, I hope to shed further light (or cast further doubt) on the useful-
ness of architectonic reasoning.
An interesting characteristic about the I Ching is that it appears to be
based on chance. For example, at 3am on the night before the Kant in
Asia conference began, I used sixteen colored marbles to select one of
the 64 hexagrams, while thinking about the following question:
9 A67/B92. These two methods are aptly illustrated by an example Kant provides
in the Second Preface of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, where he says
reason and Scripture should have “not only compatibility but also unity” (6:13,
tr. Pluhar, 2009). For an overview of how Kant’s architectonic pattern applies
to the text of this book, see my “Introduction” to Pluhar’s translation (Indian-
apolis : Hackett, 2009). Exactly how this “unity” arises (or might arise) is a ques-
tion Kant does not clearly answer in that context. But if we understand the way
architectonic reasoning operates, the problem of the unity of “the religion of
reason” with empirical religious ideas can be easily solved. See Love’s essay
(ch. 42, above) for a discussion of how this relates to the problem of religious
pluralism.
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“What is the likely result of an attempt to connect Kant’s theory of the
unity of architectonic reasoning, as manifested in his table of categories,
with the formal structure of the I Ching?” The immediate result of my
little experiment was, indeed, random in the sense that I could have
ended up selecting any one of the 64 possible combinations of marbles.
One might argue that this is so different from Kantian architectonic as to
be totally irrelevant. But wait. Kantian categories do not remove the
randomness and contingencies of our day-to-day experience; they
only help us understand how the diversity of empirical knowledge
can be unified. Should we not give the I Ching an equal chance?
My choice of marbles ended up presenting me with hexagram 21,
changing into hexagram 38. Number 21 is called “biting through”; it
shows an open mouth with an obstruction. The maxim for this hexa-
gram reads: “Energetic biting through overcomes the obstacle that pre-
vents joining of the lips.”10 This suggests that the attempt to reconcile
the opposing points of view (of Kant and the I Ching—and ultimately,
of Kant and Asian philosophy) therefore seems possible, but will require
hard work. This first hexagram represents the situation I, the asker, had
come from: during the several months prior to the conference I had
found the need, as Convener, to “bite through” several obstacles. Sig-
nificantly, the second hexagram (number 38) is called “Opposition”.
While this may appear to be not very auspicious, we should not make
such an assumption too hastily. At one level, it seems almost as if the
message conveyed by this hexagram ended up predicting the future:
after the conference, a colleague whose preferences I had “bitten
through” opposed me so strongly that he lodged a formal complaint
against me. However, the question I asked the I Ching was not personal;
so let us instead consider this deeply Kantian message that happens to be
conveyed by the commentary on hexagram 38:
In general, opposition appears as an obstruction, but when it represents po-
larity within a comprehensive whole, it has also its useful and important
functions. The oppositions of heaven and earth, spirit and nature, man
and woman, when reconciled, bring about the creation and reproduction
of life. In the world of visible things, the principle of opposites makes pos-
sible the differentiation by categories through which order is brought into
the world.11
10 I Ching or Book of Changes, the Richard Wilhelm translation, tr. Cary F. Baynes
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), 148.
11 I Ching, 148.
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Just how different is this use of architectonic reasoning from that
adopted by Kant? Clearly, they are not the same. But we should not ex-
pect them to be identical, given that the I Ching predates Kant by several
thousand years. Kant’s employment of the categories served as a tran-
scendental basis for understanding the modern scientific and religious
worldview (see note 9, above). The I Ching did (and does) nothing of
the kind, for empirical science was (at best) in its infancy when the sys-
tem of 64 hexagrams was first conceived. Nevertheless, it does exempli-
fy a method of thinking that is remarkably similar to Kant’s. Kant’s prede-
termined divisions in philosophy (especially the categories) lead us into
insights about science and religion, just as the random selection of hexa-
grams, when interpreted as a predetermined set of symbols describing
64x64 life situations, can often lead us into remarkable insights about
how to understand any given life situation.
The paradox we face when attempting to employ architectonic rea-
soning also constitutes what is arguably the single most dangerous temp-
tation faced by philosophers (or by anyone thinking philosophically).
We always have the tendency to believe that our structured understand-
ing of the nature of reality (or of any given situation) represents the ab-
solute truth. It is no accident, perhaps, that the I Ching’s reputation has
been spoiled in so many circles: the hexagrams are often used explicitly
for divination, as if we human beings could know the future simply by
casting yarrow sticks (or grabbing marbles out of a bag). Yet if we resist
this temptation, employing architectonic reasoning without forgetting
that we have created the structures in the first place, then it can be
the source of great wisdom and insight. In such uses, we actually are
“divining the truth” by imposing an architectonic structure onto the
empirical aggregate. Without adopting this approach, we can never
hope to find unity in the midst of our diverse efforts to cultivate person-
hood. Yet the lesson of Kant’s Critical philosophy is that (as aptly ex-
pressed by my friend Guy Lown, one of the participants in the Kant
in Asia conference, in a discussion we had on this topic just as I was fi-
nalizing this collection of essays) even though the purpose of architec-
tonic systems is to divine the structure of reality, we must learn to do this
without regarding the outcome of our reasoning as divine. I can think
of no better way of realizing this goal than by observing (architectonic
reasoning being but one of many examples of) how Kant’s ideas are alive
in Asia and Asian ideas resonate in Kant.
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